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Dynamics	of	Willful	Blindness:	An	Introduction		
Judith	Bovensiepen	and	Mathijs	Pelkmans		
	
Abstract.	What	are	the	politics	of	ignorance	in	an	age	of	misinformation?	How	can	the	concept	of	‘willful	
blindness’	help	us	to	understand	the	logics	involved?	We	start	the	introduction	to	this	special	issue	by	arguing	
that	the	intrinsic	instability	of	willful	blindness	draws	valuable	attention	to	the	graded	nature	of	intentionality	
and	perception,	and	the	tensions	between	them.	These	features	are	an	essential	part	of	the	workings	of	
ignorance,	as	we	illustrate	with	reference	to	the	shifting	intentions	of	drug	couriers,	the	fleeting	moments	in	
which	the	humanity	of	victims	is	recognised	in	the	midst	of	violent	acts,	and	the	affects	that	channel	economic	
behaviour,	such	as	in	the	subprime	mortgage	crisis.	When	approaching	perception	and	intentionality	as	
complexly	entangled	in	institutionalised	fields	of	power,	‘willful	blindness’	emerges	as	a	powerful	and	critical	
diagnostic	of	the	epistemic	instabilities	of	our	time.	
Keywords:	intentionality;	affect;	strategic	ignorance;	transparency;	recognition;	agnotology;	denial.	
	
	
To	be	willfully	blind	means	 shutting	out	uncomfortable	 information.	When	 taken	 literally,	
the	concept	negates	 itself.	 If	 truly	 ‘willed’	then	the	blindness	 is	more	artificial	 than	real;	 if	
truly	 ‘blind’	 then	 surely	 it	 cannot	 be	willful.	Why,	 then,	 should	 anthropologists	 adopt	 the	
notion	of	willful	blindness?	What	analytical	possibilities	does	the	concept	afford?	And	what	
dynamics	 does	 it	 capture	 that	 related	 notions	 such	 as	 ‘strategic	 ignorance’,	 ‘false	
consciousness’,	 or	 ‘denial’	 do	 not?	 This	 special	 issue	 is	 based	 on	 the	 premise	 that	 the	
antagonistic	 relationship	 between	 the	 concept’s	 two	 constitutive	 terms	 makes	 willful	
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blindness	analytically	productive.	Focussing	on	 this	 inherent	dynamism	allows	us	 to	probe	
into	 the	 relationship	 between	 knowledge	 and	 praxis,	 intention	 and	 recognition,	 and	 to	
analyse	 how	 internal	 contradictions	 are	 dealt	 with	 in	 interpersonal	 and	 institutional	
contexts.	Our	analytic	development	of	the	concept	thus	centres	on	its	intrinsic	instability.	
In	criminal	law,	willful	blindness	refers	to	‘the	deliberate	avoidance	of	knowledge	of	
the	facts’	i.e.	a	person	avoids	gaining	knowledge	as	a	means	of	avoiding	self-incrimination.1	
In	common	usage,	however,	the	term	‘willful	blindness’	evokes	a	much	broader	spectrum	of	
phenomena,	 behaviours	 and	 mental	 states.	 People	 might	 be	 ‘turning	 a	 blind	 eye’	 to	
institutional	 racism	 in	 the	 police	 force;	 or	 be	 ‘putting	 their	 head	 in	 the	 sand’	 about	
unsustainable	 family	 debt;	 they	 might	 be	 ‘denying	 a	 reality’	 about	 their	 own	 health;	 be	
‘selectively	 aware’	 about	 the	 environmental	 impact	 of	 individual	 life-choices;	 ‘consciously	
avoid’	 knowledge	 of	 the	 working	 conditions	 in	 the	 factories	 where	 their	 clothes	 are	
produced;	or	be	‘suspending	disbelief’	when	faced	with	‘convenient	fictions’	about	a	Brexit	
in	which	you	could	have	your	cake	and	eat	it.	Phrases	such	as	‘the	ostrich	complex’	or	‘the	
public	 secret’	 similarly	 evoke	 the	 idea	 that	 people	 are	 able	 to	 see	 or	 know	 about	
uncomfortable	truths,	but	find	a	way	of	blinding	themselves	to	them.		
Willful	 blindness	 can	 imply	 both	 strategic	 (non-)perception	 and	 normalised	
disposition.	Our	 goal	 is	 not	 to	 develop	 a	 static	 definition	 or	 typology	 of	willful	 blindness.	
Instead,	we	highlight	how	the	term	captures	the	tension	between	perception	and	blindness,	
and	between	internalisation	and	deliberation.	Willful	blindness	speaks	directly	to	how	forms	
of	domination	become	naturalised	and	embodied,	as	well	as	describing	more	calculated	and	
strategic	forms	of	 ignorance.	The	strength	of	the	concept	 lies	 in	 its	ability	to	capture	both	
	
1	56	Fed.	Reg.	57974,	57976	(November	15,	1991);	citing	United	State	v	Jewell,	532	F.2d	at	697,	700,	(9th	Cir.	
1976).		
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conscious	and	unconscious	forms	of	ignorance,	as	well	as	the	myriad	slippages	in	between.	
Willful	blindness	must	therefore	be	understood	as	 inhabiting	a	spectrum	where	deliberate	
unawareness	is	on	one	side,	and	normalised	blindness	or	unconscious	disregard	on	another	
side	 of	 the	 spectrum.	 Rather	 than	 seeing	manifestations	 of	willful	 blindness	 as	 fixed	 in	 a	
specific	 location	of	 this	 spectrum,	we	direct	attention	to	 the	shifting	back	and	 forth	along	
gradations	of	knowledge	and	non-knowledge,	awareness,	perception	and	deliberation.	Key	
questions,	 therefore,	 are:	What	 animates	movement	 across	 the	 spectrum?	What	 are	 the	
social	dynamics	that	shape	the	unstable	relationship	between	willfulness	and	blindness?	
The	articles	in	this	special	issue	examine	willful	blindness	in	the	context	of	financial	
servicing,	 consultancy,	 resource	 extraction,	 climate	 change,	 scientific	 knowledge	
production,	 and	 statelessness.	 Willful	 blindness	 emerges	 as	 a	 diagnostic	 of	 the	
contradictions	and	epistemological	 instabilities	of	 the	human	condition,	and	of	how	these	
play	out	in	different	ethnographic	circumstances.	While	the	individual	contributions	to	this	
special	 issue	 explore	 how	willful	 blindness	 is	 produced	 in	 specific	 political	 and	 economic	
contexts,	 the	 introduction	makes	 the	 case	 for	 sharpening	 up	 the	 concept	 by	 focusing	 on	
three	key	dynamics:	first,	we	explore	the	role	of	intention	and	its	assumed	relationship	with	
agency,	 concentrating	 particularly	 on	 the	 fluidity	 of	 intentionality	 and	 awareness.	 The	
second	 focus	 is	 on	 the	 vicissitudes	 of	 perception	 via	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 dynamics	 of	
recognition.	 The	 third	 key	 dynamic	 we	 explore	 is	 the	 power	 of	 conviction	 and	 affect	 in	
determining	what	will	 be	 seen	 and	what	will	 be	 known,	 paying	 attention	 to	 how	 shared	
emotions	fuel	the	ways	in	which	groups	or	individuals	slice	up	reality	and	make	it	in/visible.	
Finally,	 we	 point	 out	 how	 the	 fluctuations	 of	 wilfulness	 and	 blindness	 reverberate	 with	
political	and	economic	conditions.	Before	focussing	on	these	key	dynamics,	the	introduction	
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takes	 a	 brief	 look	 at	 some	 of	 the	 assumptions	 implicit	 in	 the	 emerging	 anthropological	
literature	on	the	politics	and	productivity	of	ignorance.		
	
THE	WILLFUL	BLINDNESS	CONTINUUM:	POLITICS	AND	PRODUCTIVITY	OF	IGNORANCE		
The	last	decade	has	seen	an	upsurge	in	anthropological	studies	of	ignorance,	with	Mair	et	al.	
stating	 most	 explicitly	 the	 need	 for	 ‘seeing	 ignorance	 as	 an	 ethnographic	 object’	 and	
thereby	 establishing	 ‘the	 ethnography	 of	 ignorance’	 (2012:	 3-4)	 as	 a	 field	 of	 inquiry.	 This	
involves	seeing	ignorance	not	as	a	residual	category,	but	as	an	active	product	of	epistemic	
techniques	 (Kirsch	 and	 Dilley	 2015).	 As	 Bovensiepen	 argues	 (this	 issue),	 anthropological	
studies	of	 ignorance	 tend	 to	emphasise	one	of	 two	aspects:	 either	how	 ignorance	 can	be	
used	 strategically	 as	 a	 tool	 for	wielding	political	power,	or	 they	 stress	 the	generative	and	
socially	productive	dimensions	of	ignorance,	embedded	within	existing	cultural	practice.		
Scholars	focusing	on	the	use	of	ignorance	in	larger	power	plays,	highlight	ignorance	
as	symbolic	capital	(Gherson	and	Raj	2000),	as	a	form	of	governmentality	(Mathews	2005),	
or	as	a	defining	feature	of	bureaucracy	(Graeber	2015a).	Ignorance	is	shown	to	be	used	as	a	
tool	of	governance	by	being	produced	in	others	(Mair	et	al	2012:	15;	Kirsch	and	Dilley	2015:	
19),	for	example	by	de-valuing	or	refusing	to	recognise	the	knowledge	of	specific	groups	or	
populations	(Vitebsky	1993).	This	approach	shares	some	base	assumptions	with	approaches	
developed	by	scholars	working	on	the	sociology	of	knowledge	and	science	and	technology	
studies.	 Thus,	 Proctor	 coined	 the	 term	 ‘agnotology’	 to	 examine	 how	 governments	 or	
corporations	employ	ignorance	and	doubt	strategically,	for	example	by	insisting	to	keep	the	
question	 of	 the	 human	 contribution	 to	 global	 warming	 ‘open’	 (Proctor	 2008:	 15).	 Along	
similar	 lines,	 the	deployment	of	 ‘strategic	 ignorance’	 in	bureaucratic	 institutions	 (McGoey	
2007)	is	understood	to	facilitate	the	expansion	of	institutional	power	(Best	2012:	100)	while	
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the	British	government’s	intentional	manufacture	of	ignorance	and	uncertainty	about	death	
tolls	 in	 the	 Iraq	War	 has	 been	 shown	 to	 serve	 as	 a	means	 of	 deflecting	 political	 criticism	
(Rappert	2012:	43-44).	As	in	the	mentioned	examples,	much	of	this	literature	sees	ignorance	
as	 collective,	 strategic	 and	 rational	 fabrications.2	 The	 associated	 assumption	 is	 that	
institutions	are	able	to	coordinate	their	activities,	are	motivated	by	the	pursuit	of	an	overall	
long-term	goal	and	driven	by	logic	and	reason,	rather	than	context	or	affect.		
The	other	main	strand	in	the	anthropology	of	ignorance	centres	on	the	‘productivity	
of	 ignorance’	 (Mair	 et	 al.	 2012:	 15)	 and	 its	 ‘social	 effects’	 (Kirsch	 and	 Dilley	 2015:	 20).	
Analyses	of	 ‘the	creative	aspects	of	absent	knowledge’	 (Højer	2009:	575;	Pedersen	2017),	
focus	 less	 on	 powerful	 institutions,	 governments	 or	 corporations,	 and	 more	 on	 ordinary	
citizens	and	the	religious	or	social	dynamics	that	shape	their	lives.	Professing	to	be	ignorant	
of	 their	 ancestral	 religion,	 for	 example,	 can	 empower	 Sarawak	 Christians	 (in	 Malaysian	
Borneo)	 to	 avoid	 obligations	 towards	 demanding	 spirits	 (Chua	 2009).	 Ignorance	 can	 be	 a	
strategy	 for	 maintaining	 peaceful	 relationships	 or	 avoiding	 conflicts	 (High	 2015;	
Bovensiepen	 2014:	 66-67);	 secretiveness	 can	 have	 generative	 social	 and	 political	 effects	
(Kirsch	2015;	Pelkmans	and	Machold	2011).	 In	contrast	to	the	‘political	critique’	 literature,	
studies	 examining	 the	 social	 effects	 of	 ignorance	 rarely	 import	 assumptions	 about	
autonomous	 rational	 actors	 and	 instead	 focus	 on	 socio-cultural	 contexts	 within	 which	
ignorance	is	produced	and	embedded.		
The	 two	 strands	we	 identified	 in	 the	anthropological	 literature	on	 ignorance	differ	
with	 regards	 to	 how	 they	 conceptualise	 the	 relationship	 between	 intention	 and	 social	
action.	In	philosophy	such	issues	are	discussed	as	questions	about	the	relationship	between	
	
2	Graeber’s	(2015a:	38)	work	is	an	exception	here,	since	he	stresses	how	bureaucratic	institutions	rather	than	
acting	rationally,	merely	use	the	discourse	of	‘rationality’	as	a	way	of	hiding	their	true	values.		
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consciousness	and	the	world,	the	inner	self	and	human	behaviour.	In	his	analysis	of	speech	
acts,	the	analytical	philosopher	John	Searle	(1983),	for	example,	maintained	that	a	person’s	
intention	 is	what	makes	action	meaningful	 (Duranti	2015:	11-19).	This	argument	has	been	
criticised	 by	 anthropologists	 for	 assuming	 that	 speakers	 are	 ‘autonomous	 selves’	 whose	
actions	would	be	based	on	individual	intention,	not	constrained	by	social	expectations	and	
relationships	 (Rosaldo	 1982:	 204).	 Indeed,	 many	 anthropologists	 have	 emphasized	 the	
mutual	constitution	of	self	and	the	world	(e.g.	Bourdieu	1977;	Ortner	1984),	proposing	that	
ignorance	itself	might	be	seen	as	‘praxis’	(Anand	2015:	309).	
The	anthropology	of	ignorance	tends	to	ascribe	deliberate	action	to	governments	or	
corporations,	 while	 the	 non-knowledge	 of	 non-state	 actors	 tends	 to	 be	 examined	 as	
embodied	praxis	or	to	be	understood	within	specific	social	and	historical	contexts.	By	seeing	
different	forms	of	willful	blindness	as	existing	on	a	spectrum	–	with	strategic	ignorance	on	
one	extreme	and	 ignorance	as	praxis	on	the	other	–	we	seek	to	avoid	taking	an	approach	
that	 differentiates	 according	 to	 the	 object	 of	 study.	 Adopting	 a	 graded	 notion	 of	
intentionality	 (Duranti	 2015:	 39)	 also	 helps	 us	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 why	 some	 societies	
underplay	 intention	 in	 favour	 of	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	 pragmatic	 effects	 of	 human	 action	
(Robbins	and	Rumsey	2008).	However,	rather	than	mapping	societies	onto	an	intentionality	
continuum,	we	argue	that	intentionality	is	itself	unstable,	and	that	this	instability	shapes	the	
dynamics	of	willful	blindness	in	individuals,	institutions	and	groups.		
	
INTENTION	AS	PROCESS	
In	criminal	 law,	where	the	term	originates,	willful	blindness	 is	established	if	the	accused	is	
aware	of	the	(probable)	existence	of	a	fact,	but	has	deliberately	avoided	obtaining	‘positive	
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knowledge’	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 culpability	 (Robbins	 1990:	 196).3	 Particularly	 instructive	 are	
cases	 related	 to	 narcotics	 prosecution	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 such	 as	 the	 prominent	 1976	
United	States	versus	Jewell	case.	In	this	court	case,	Mr.	Jewell	claimed	ignorance	about	the	
110	 pounds	 of	marihuana	 that	were	 stashed	 in	 a	 secret	 compartment	 of	 the	 car	 he	was	
driving	 north	 across	 the	Mexican	 –	 US	 border,	 a	 trip	 he	 agreed	 to	make	 in	 return	 for	 a	
substantial	 sum	of	money.	 The	 court	 ruled	 that	 this	was	a	 case	of	 ‘wilful	 blindness’,	 here	
referring	to	an	‘actor	who	is	aware	of	the	probable	existence	of	a	material	fact	but	does	not	
satisfy	himself	that	it	does	not	in	fact	exist’.	The	court	ruled	that	Mr.	Jewell’s	ignorance	was	
deliberate,	and	that	‘deliberate	ignorance	and	positive	knowledge	are	equally	culpable’.4	
	 The	United	States	versus	Jewell	case	 is	 interesting	not	 just	because	 it	offers	a	 legal	
definition	 of	 willful	 blindness,	 but	 also	 because	 it	 reveals	 the	 difficulty	 of	 defining	
‘knowledge’	and	‘knowing’.	The	majority	opinion	states	that	 ‘to	act	“knowingly”	 .	 .	 .	 is	not	
necessarily	 to	act	only	with	positive	 knowledge,	but	also	 to	act	with	an	awareness	of	 the	
high	 probability	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 fact	 in	 question’.5	 For	 the	 judges,	 however,	
acknowledging	 such	 gradations	 of	 knowledge	 did	 not	 translate	 into	 an	 equally	 graded	
notion	 of	 intentionality.	 Rather,	 the	 opinion	 describes	 the	 appellant	 as	 having	 acted	with	
‘conscious	 purpose’,	 someone	 who	 acted	 ‘voluntarily	 and	 intentionally’	 rather	 than	 ‘by	
	
3	The	term	willful	blindness	was	first	used	by	English	authorities	in	1861	in	response	to	a	defendant’s	plea	of	
not	having	known	that	the	goods	that	he	had	appropriated	belonged	to	the	government.	The	implication	was	
that	if	the	authorities	could	establish	that	the	defendant	was	willfully	ignorant,	he	would	be	guilty	of	a	criminal	
offence	(Robbins	1990:	196).	
4	United	State	v	Jewell,	532	F.2d	at	697,	700,	(9th	Cir.	1976),	at	https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/collages/17709	
5	United	State	v	Jewell,	532	F.2d	at	697,	700,	(9th	Cir.	1976).		
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accident	or	mistake’,	and	indeed	‘consciously	avoids’	gaining	positive	knowledge.6	 In	doing	
so	the	 legal	opinion	reveals	two	things:	 first,	 that	the	modern	 legal	system	–	necessarily	–	
sees	 actors	 as	 autonomous	 and	 rational	 individuals;	 second,	 it	 assumes	 a	 direct	 and	
straightforwardly	 causal	 link	 between	 intention	 and	 action.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	Western	
legal	system	is	intentionalist.		
	We	 obviously	 cannot	 reconstruct	 the	 role	 of	material	 and	 emotive	 factors	 in	Mr.	
Jewell’s	conduct,	and	to	what	extend	it	was	premeditated.	But	it	is	worth	pointing	out	that	
the	 literature	on	drug	mules	 shows	 that	 intentionality	 in	 such	cases	 is	often	unstable	and	
shifting.	It	might	hence	be	better	understood	as	a	process,	which	‘does	not	imply	that	actors	
have	definite	goals	consciously	held	 in	mind	during	the	course	of	 their	activities’	 (Giddens	
1979:	56	in	Duranti	2015:	21).	Fleetwood’s	work	on	female	cocaine	traders	shows	that	their	
involvement	was	motivated	by	 love	and	money,	and	that	decisions	were	often	haphazard,	
without	 full	 view	 of	 what	 was	 to	 come.	 As	 one	 woman	 remembered	 her	 thinking	 when	
offered	 10,000	 dollars	 for	 making	 a	 trip:	 ‘Yeah.	 Why	 not?	 Nothing	 to	 lose’	 (2014:	 114).	
Despite	a	discourse	of	free	will	among	drug	dealers,	the	structural	conditions	pushing	them	
towards	certain	choices	lay	heavily	on	them	(Bourgeois	1995).	Law	can	only	deal	with	these	
material,	affective,	and	situational	factors	as	secondary,	mitigating	circumstances.	For	us,	by	
contrast,	 the	 complex	 social	 and	 political	 entanglements	within	which	willful	 blindness	 is	
constituted	are	crucial	in	shaping	the	fluctuations	of	awareness	and	intention.		
Acknowledging	that	intentionality	is	processual,	constituted	in	practical	engagement	
with	 the	world,	and	 informed	by	affective	and	material	 contingencies,	obviously	does	not	
mean	 that	we	 should	 be	 so	 naive	 as	 to	 ignore	 the	 possibility	 of	 premeditated	 blindness.	
	
6	United	State	v	Jewell,	532	F.2d	at	697,	699-700,	(9th	Cir.	1976).	
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Strategic	 ignorance	 is	 often	 an	 essential	 element	 of	 political	 projects.	 It	may	 include	 the	
manipulation	of	data	or	self-closure	from	incriminating	 information,	to	avoid	culpability	or	
to	 advance	 economic	 and	 political	 agendas.	 However,	 those	 agendas	 do	 not	 necessarily	
need	 to	be	 fully	 conscious.	 The	articles	 in	 this	 collection	 suggest	 that	 even	when	 there	 is	
strategic	meditation	 amongst	 some	 actors,	 these	 strategic	 deployments	 of	 ignorance	 are	
nested	within	more	habitual	forms	of	willful	blindness.	Dinah	Rajak’s	(2020)	article	on	willful	
blindness	 in	 oil	 companies	 is	 emblematic	 in	 this	 regard.	 She	 focuses	 on	 sustainability	
managers	who	‘want	a	future	for	our	grandchildren	too’,	but	end	up	accepting	a	‘reality’	as	
defined	by	 short-term	market	 forces.	Here,	 blindness	 refers	 to	mechanisms	 that	 constrict	
fields	 of	 vision,	 thereby	 leaving	 the	 larger	 issues	of	 pollution	 and	 climate	 change	unseen,	
and	 their	 causes	 unchallenged.	 Similarly,	 Peluso’s	 (2020)	 study	 of	 ‘Chinese	 Walls’	 in	
investment	banks,	which	are	key	 to	avoiding	 conflicts	of	 interest,	 illustrates	 that	 strategic	
ignorance	can	be	more	 intuitive	than	cognitive.	She	shows	how	the	analysts	and	 investors	
have	developed	a	 sensitivity	 that	allows	 them	to	 ‘know’	what	 is	happening,	even	without	
seeing	 or	 hearing	 the	 actual	 information	 –	 	 willful	 blindness	 becomes	 an	 embodied	
disposition.	
Intention	 clearly	 cannot	 be	 considered	 separate	 from	 degrees	 of	 perception.	 To	
briefly	return	to	United	States	versus	Jewell,	 this	point	was	 implicitly	acknowledged	in	the	
dissenting	opinion.	Although	agreeing	 that	Mr.	 Jewell	was	culpable	of	driving	a	car	with	a	
hidden	stash	of	marihuana,	it	didn’t	see	how	he	could	be	guilty	of	the	intent	to	distribute:	‘It	
is	difficult	to	explain	that	a	defendant	can	specifically	intend	to	distribute	a	substance	unless	
he	knows	that	he	possesses	it’.7		
	
	
7	United	State	v	Jewell,	532	F.2d	at	697,	705-706,	(9th	Cir.	1976).	
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PERCEPTION	AND	RECOGNITION		
We	 might	 want	 to	 approach	 willful	 blindness	 by	 considering	 its	 counterpoints.	 In	
development	and	governance	circles,	transparency	is	commonly	thought	to	produce	a	field	
of	 clear	 vision	 and	 accountability.	 However,	 transparency	 projects	 often	 generate	 new	
forms	 of	 opaqueness	 and	 invisibility.	 This	 is	 so	 because	 complete	 visibility	 is	 usually	
unattainable,	meaning	that	transparency	projects	can	only	push	the	limits	of	the	visible	a	bit	
further,	and	tend	to	do	so	by	channelling	vision	in	particular	directions	(Sanders	and	West	
2003;	Pelkmans	2009).	 If	not	transparency,	what,	then,	constitutes	the	anti-thesis	of	wilful	
blindness?	We	would	like	to	propose	that	recognition	captures	the	kind	of	social	dynamics	
that	run	counter	to	willful	blindness.	Let	us	illustrate	this	through	an	example.		
The	 2007	 documentary,	 To	 see	 if	 I	 am	 smiling,	 focuses	 on	 seven	 female	 Israeli	
soldiers.	One	of	 the	women	describes	her	 first	operation	at	 the	age	of	20	 in	 the	occupied	
Palestinian	 territories.	 A	 Palestinian	 settlement	 had	 been	 bombed,	 and	 residents	 were	
running	out	of	their	houses.	The	soldier	and	her	team	were	charged	with	trying	to	contain	
the	 chaos.	 She	 was	 given	 a	 club	 by	 her	 superior	 and	 told	 to	 ‘go	 out	 and	 start	 hitting’.	
Suddenly,	 amidst	 the	 chaos,	 the	 soldier	 heard	 a	 cry	 of	 a	 child.	 She	 turned	 around	 and	
wanted	to	pick	up	the	Palestinian	child.	‘It	was	so	instinctive’	she	said,	‘to	hug	him,	to	calm	
him	down’.	‘Then	his	mother	came	out	and	looked	at	me,	with	such	hatred	in	her	eyes’,	she	
continued,	 ‘And	at	 that	moment,	 I	 realised	exactly	who	 I	was	and	how	she	 saw	me’.	 This	
scene	clearly	 illustrates	 the	double	movement	 involved	 in	 the	process	of	 recognition.	The	
soldier’s	 internal	 response	 to	 the	 sound	 of	 a	 crying	 child	 leads	 her	 to	 recognise	 the	
personhood	 of	 those	 she	 was	 ordered	 to	 contain.	 Yet,	 this	 unexpected	 perspectival	
inversion	also	made	her	realise	how	the	Palestinian	woman	might	see	her.	She	was	suddenly	
able	to	look	at	herself,	through	the	eyes	of	the	other.		
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The	 concept	of	 recognition	 is	 helpful	 in	 examining	 the	optics	of	 power,	 because	 it	
pushes	 us	 to	 consider	 that	 ‘blindness’	 and	 ‘visibility’	 are	 layered,	 involving	 not	 only	 a	
physical	 but	 also	 a	 social	 dimension.	 As	 Honneth	 and	Margalit	 (2001:	 113)	 put	 it,	 social	
visibility	is	more	than	just	cognising	(Erkennen);	it	entails	recognising	(Anerkennen)	which	in	
the	case	of	seeing	a	person	implies	perception	of	their	properties	and	of	 ‘the	character	of	
the	relationship’.	It	is	recognition	of	others	‘as	the	subject	of	a	morally	practical	reason’	that	
Immanuel	 Kant	 (1996:	 557)	 identified	 as	 one	 of	 the	 foundational	 blocks	 for	 any	 moral	
society.	 In	 the	 example	 above,	 it	 was	 the	 spontaneous	 moment	 of	 identification	 with	 a	
protester	 that	 momentarily	 shattered	 the	 ‘mind-set’	 in	 which	 she	 was	 merely	 ‘following	
instructions’.	 She	 did	 not	 just	 see	 the	 other,	 she	 recognised	 her	 as	 a	 social	 and	 moral	
person.		
Denying	the	personhood	of	others	requires	effort,	as	studies	of	violence	and	killing	
have	repeatedly	shown.	Christopher	Browning’s	(1992)	analysis	of	‘Reserve	Police	Battalion	
101’,	a	Nazi	Germany	killing	unit	of	500	men,	most	of	whom	were	middle-aged	policemen	
from	 the	 Hamburg	 region,	 is	 emblematic	 in	 this	 regard.	 Based	 on	 an	 analysis	 of	 125	
testimonies,	Browning	demonstrates	how	the	social	mechanisms	of	obedience	to	authority	
and	peer	pressure	turned	the	vast	majority	of	these	‘ordinary	men’	into	effective	killers.	But	
they	were	not	killers	to	begin	with.	The	description	of	these	men’s	first	assignment	(to	kill	
the	 vast	majority	 of	 the	 1,800	 Jewish	 inhabitants	 of	 the	 village	 of	 Jósefów)	 is	 particularly	
revealing.	Major	Wilhelm	 Trapp	 had	 given	 the	 order	with	 ‘choking	 voice	 and	 tears	 in	 his	
eyes’,	 and	 while	 only	 a	 dozen	 men	 publicly	 backed	 out	 of	 the	 assignment,	 many	 others	
found	ways	to	‘slip	off’	or,	 in	the	words	of	one,	‘had	become	so	sick	that	I	simply	couldn’t	
anymore’	after	his	first	kill	(Browning	1992:	1-2,	66-67).		
	 12	
The	point	is	that	the	task	of	killing	initially	highlights	the	full	humanity	of	the	victim.	
Indeed,	the	suddenness	of	the	task	and	the	rather	patchy	ideologisation,	meant	that	most	
killers	could	not	help	but	see	their	targets	as	persons.	However,	the	description	also	reveals	
that	 mechanisms	 to	 produce	 blindness	 immediately	 started	 to	 kick	 in.	 The	 rationalising	
narratives	 of	 obedience	 to	 a	 larger	 power,	 placing	 responsibility	 onto	 higher	 authorities,	
dehumanising	 the	 victims,	 and	 an	 ideology	 of	 duty	 towards	 the	 group	 made	 killing	
bearable.8	Sheer	repetition	further	contributed	to	a	numbing	of	the	senses:	‘Like	much	else,	
killing	was	 something	 one	 could	 get	 used	 to’	 (Browning	 1992:	 85).	Within	months,	 these	
‘ordinary	 men	 had	 become	 efficient,	 untroubled	 killers	 of	 helpless	 civilians’	 (Clendinnen	
1999:	131).9	
Systematic	mass	killing	involves	willfully	ignoring	the	full	humanity	of	the	victims	and	
this	requires	concerted	effort	that	can	be	achieved	via	a	number	of	key	mechanisms.	Whilst	
we	do	not	wish	to	equate	the	willful	blindness	described	by	contributors	to	this	special	issue	
to	that	of	genocidal	killings,	some	of	the	mechanisms	via	which	recognition	can	be	averted	
are	 similar.	 In	 her	 discussion	 of	 undocumented	 children	 in	Malaysia,	 Allerton	 (2020,	 this	
issue)	shows	how	the	state	discourse	of	deservingness	leads	to	the	denigration	of	‘foreign’	
children	 as	 a	 drain	 on	 resources	 and	 to	 a	 failure	 to	 recognise	 them	 as	 worthy	 of	 moral	
	
8	For	elaborate	discussions	of	the	mechanisms	of	‘denial’,	‘desensitisation’,	or	‘blindness’	of	perpetrators	of	
violence,	see	Stanley	Cohen’s	chapter	‘Accounting	for	Atrocities’	(2001:	76-116),	Alexander	Hinton’s	article	
‘Why	did	you	kill’	(1998),	and	Christopher	Browning’s	Ordinary	Men	(1992).			
9	In	line	with	this	Grossman	(1995:	13)	has	written	that	‘the	history	of	warfare	can	be	seen	as	a	history	of	
increasingly	more	effective	mechanisms	for	enabling	and	conditioning	men	to	overcome	their	innate	
resistance	to	killing	their	fellow	human	beings’.	He	finds	that	while	a	small	percentage	of	recruits	kill	easily,	
most	must	be	trained	to	do	so.		
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respect.	Placing	responsibility	on	‘higher	authorities’	is	a	key	mechanism	via	which	this	can	
be	 achieved.	 Kirsch’s	 article	 (2020,	 this	 issue)	 shows	 that	 how	we	 define	 knowledge	 can	
itself	 shape	 our	 vision.	 Analysing	 the	 rationalisations	 of	 a	 prominent	 environmental	
sociologist	 who	 consulted	 for	 Exxon	 after	 the	 Valdez	 oil	 spill,	 Kirsch	 shows	 how	 a	
commitment	 to	 ‘scientific	 objectivity’	 leaves	 him	 blind	 to	 the	 larger	 ethical,	 personal	 and	
political	 responsibilities,	which	 is	how	he	ended	up	abetting	the	 interests	of	big	oil,	at	 the	
expense	of	communities	affected	by	pollution.		
	
AFFECTIVE	(NON-)KNOWLEDGE	
People	have	a	tendency	to	deny,	dismiss,	divert,	or	displace	information	that	disrupts	their	
efforts	 to	 create	 coherent	 and	 liveable	 worlds	 (Rayner	 2012).	 As	 we	 saw	 in	 previous	
sections,	 drug	 mules	 dismissed	 thoughts	 about	 potential	 negative	 consequences	 when	
embracing	 short-term	 gains,	 while	 killers	 denied	 the	 humanity	 of	 the	 victim	 or	 the	
implications	of	 their	actions	 to	preserve	a	sense	of	 their	own	humanity.	These	 tendencies	
have	strong	emotive	qualities.	We	discuss	the	affective	dimension	of	willful	blindness	via	a	
final	example,	the	2007/8	subprime	mortgage	scandal.	
	 In	his	study	of	debt	advisors	in	the	UK,	Davey	shows	that	the	bulk	of	their	work	with	
low-income	 clients	 consists	 of	 identifying	 all	 debts	 and	 payment	 requirements,	 details	 of	
which	their	clients	were	often	unaware	of	or	had	ignored	(2017:	10).	This	was	partly	due	to	
the	obscure	 language	of	 financial	 and	 legal	 contracts,	 but	 also	 because	 the	 confrontation	
with	 payment	 requirements	 is	 emotionally	 upsetting.	 This	 particular	 articulation	 of	willful	
blindness	 gained	 public	 visibility	 in	 the	 subprime	 mortgage	 crisis.	 Overconfidence	 in	 the	
continued	rise	of	the	housing	market,	the	positive	connotations	of	mortgages	in	contrast	to	
most	 other	 debts	 (see	 Killick	 2011),	 and	 far-reaching	 deregulation	 of	mortgage	 provision	
	 14	
created	a	toxic	mixture	 for	many	borrowers.	 Indeed,	 the	stigma	attached	to	defaulting	on	
one’s	mortgage	meant	that	those	affected	tended	to	hide	their	crisis	from	others,	as	well	as	
from	 themselves,	 with	 negative	 material	 and	 mental	 health	 consequences	 (Keene	 et	 al.	
2015).	
	 This	 interplay	 between	 interests,	 emotions,	 and	 blindness	 was	 not	 restricted	 to	
debtors;	 it	 equally	 affected	 lenders	 and	 regulators.	 During	 the	 subprime	mortgage	 boom	
most	 actors	 were	 aware	 of	 some	 of	 the	 risks,	 but	 they	 downplayed	 these,	 imagined	
themselves	 to	be	exempt,	and/or	abstained	from	connecting	the	dots.	Thus,	while	certain	
mortgage	 providers	 described	 their	 own	 products	 as	 ‘suicide	 mortgages’,	 they	 did	 not	
anticipate	the	crisis	to	spread	beyond	affected	borrowers.	Midlevel	managers	 in	mortgage	
securitisation	 continued	 to	 invest	 their	 own	 resources	 –	 in	 fact	 increasing	 their	 exposure	
during	the	boom	–	literally	buying	into	their	own	optimistic	economic	theories	(Cheng	et	al	
2014:	2799).	Alan	Greenspan,	then	Chair	of	the	Federal	Reserve	of	the	United	States,	claims	
to	 have	 been	 aware	 of	 the	 risks	 of	 relaxing	 the	 regulations	 on	 subprime	 lending,	 but	
considered	this	necessary	to	widen	the	political	support	basis	for	property	rights,	seen	as	an	
essential	pillar	of	the	market	economy	(Killick	2011:	360).		
The	side-lining	of	 risk	and	the	continuation	of	overly	optimistic	assessments	of	 the	
housing	 market	 even	 when	 indicators	 increasingly	 point	 in	 the	 opposite	 direction	 is	
attributable	 to	a	combination	of	confirmation	bias,	group-think,	and	cognitive	dissonance.	
Confirmation	 bias	 refers	 to	 the	 tendency	 to	 lend	 more	 credence	 to	 information	 that	
confirms	 already	 held	 beliefs,	 particularly	 so	 when	 such	 confirmation	 intersects	 with	
personal	interests	of	material	or	emotive	nature	(Nickerson	1998).	These	tendencies	can	be	
amplified	in	group	settings.	Cheng	et	al.	(2014:	2827)	highlight	that	job	environments	in	the	
finance	 industry	 fostered	 groupthink	 and	 over	 optimism.	 Pointing	 in	 the	 same	 direction,	
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Tuckett	 documents	 the	 circulation	 of	 ‘dangerously	 exciting	 stories’	 among	 senior	 finance	
managers	in	the	run-up	to	the	financial	crisis,	and	‘strange	group	processes	in	which	realistic	
thinking	 is	 fundamentally	disturbed’,	so	that	normal	caution	about	risk-taking	was	 ignored	
and	 alternative	 views	 were	 dismissed	 (2011:	 x,	 xv).	 Excitement,	 uncertainty	 and	 anxiety	
were	 key	 in	 shaping	 the	 decisions	 of	 financial	 traders,	 as	 was	 the	 desire	 to	 coordinate	
feelings	with	the	rest	of	the	group,	which	he	calls	‘group	feel’	(Tuckett	2011:	xii).		
The	 affective	 dimensions	 of	 willful	 blindness	 also	 clearly	 emerge	 throughout	 the	
articles	 in	 this	 special	 issue.	 In	 Timor-Leste’s	 emerging	 oil	 industry,	willful	 blindness	 gains	
traction	 from	 the	 emotive	 force	 garnered	 by	 the	 discourse	 on	 resource	 nationalism	 and	
resistance	 against	 foreign	 occupation	 (Bovensiepen,	 this	 special	 issue).	 This	 allows	 East	
Timorese	 oil	 company	 employees	 to	 move	 in	 and	 out	 of	 awareness	 about	 the	 potential	
failure	and	negative	side-effects	of	oil	infrastructure	development.	These	kind	of	‘conviction	
narratives’	 (Tuckett	and	Nicolic	2017)	 influence	people’s	disposition	 towards	various	kinds	
of	 information	–	as	becomes	clear	 in	Felix	Stein’s	discussion	of	blindness	 in	a	 consultancy	
firm	 (this	 special	 issue).	Rhetoric,	pragmatism	and	strong	assumptions	allow	management	
consultants	 to	 compartmentalise	 awareness	 in	 a	 way	 that	 is	 beneficial	 to	 the	 aim	 of	
maximising	profit.	
These	examples	demonstrate	 that	knowledge	 is	affectively	mediated,	but	also	 that	
these	affects	are	socially	constituted,	and	obtain	their	concrete	features	in	group	dynamics.	
When	the	sociologist	Donald	Mackenzie	characterised	the	credit	crisis	as	‘a	problem	in	the	
sociology	of	knowledge’	(2011)	he	highlighted	that	asset-backed	securities	and	collateralised	
debt	obligation	were	too	technical	to	be	understood	by	many,	which	prevented	problems	to	
be	detected	and	 fed	back	 to	 the	system.	We	would	 like	 to	add	 that	even	when	problems	
were	 detected,	 the	 emotional	 costs	 of	 such	 information	 prevented	 it	 from	 circulating.	
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Indeed,	evidence	shows	that	regulators	were	increasingly	aware	of	the	risks	to	the	system,	
but	 because	 of	 convenience,	 because	 they	 wished	 it	 away,	 or	 because	 they	 feared	 the	
consequences,	 they	 decided	 not	 to	 act.	 These	 reflections	 on	 how	 the	 circulation	 of	
knowledge	 is	affectively	mediated,	and	how	 ignorance	resonates	 through	social	networks,	
link	directly	to	the	next	and	final	section.	
	
WILLFUL	BLINDNESS	AS	A	CONCEPT	OF	CRITIQUE		
The	articles	in	this	special	issue	all	pay	attention	to	selective	perception	of	those	in	position	
of	relative	power,	from	the	rationalisations	by	environment-minded	employees	working	for	
oil	companies	(Rajak),	to	the	deliberations	of	academics	and	private	sector	analysts	engaged	
in	 consultancy	 work	 (Stein;	 Kirsch).	 ‘Blindness’	 can	 become	 institutionalised	 to	 render	
stateless	children	 invisible	(Allerton),	to	uphold	the	fiction	of	financial	 integrity	(Peluso)	or	
to	 finance	 expensive	 oil	 infrastructure	 unlikely	 to	 serve	 local	 communities	 (Bovensiepen).	
The	contributions	to	illustrate	that	willful	blindness	is	rarely	a	product	of	either	deliberation	
or	 emotion	 alone,	 but	 usually	 involves	 complex	 and	 unstable	 processes	 of	 activating	 and	
deactivating	 certain	 reflections	 and	 feelings.	 Taken	 together,	 these	 articles	 thus	
demonstrate	how	the	biases	and	blind	spots	of	individuals	become	entrenched	as	they	link	
up	 with	 economic	 and	 political	 structures.	 They	 also,	 and	 importantly,	 demonstrate	 the	
affective	and	epistemic	underpinnings	of	our	political	economy.		
As	we	asked	at	the	beginning,	why	should	anthropologists	adopt	the	notion	of	willful	
blindness?	And	is	it	not	an	overly	judgemental	concept?	Unlike	hegemony,	which	focuses	on	
the	 ideological	 constructs	 that	 are	 evoked	 to	 reproduce	 dominance	 and	 authority	 over	
others,	 the	 concept	 of	 willful	 blindness	 in	 this	 collection	 focuses	 on	 the	 stories	 those	 in	
power	 tell	 themselves	 to	 legitimise	 their	actions	 towards	 themselves.	This	does	not	mean	
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that	 willful	 blindness	 does	 not	 exist	 amongst	 ordinary	 people	 or	 non-elites.	 As	 we	 have	
hinted	 throughout	 this	 introduction,	 a	 dose	 of	 wilful	 blindness	 is	 surely	 a	 vital	 part	 of	
everyday	life	(Heffernan	2011:	23).	We	all	need	to	blind	ourselves	to	some	of	our	own	flaws,	
contradictions	 and	 hypocrisies.	Willful	 blindness	 is	 equally	 essential	 to	 the	 establishment	
and	maintenance	of	meaningful	relationships	–	a	way	of	avoiding	conflict.	However,	it	is	our	
contention	 that	 for	 a	 number	 of	 reasons	 the	 concept	 of	 willful	 blindness	 is	 particularly	
helpful	concept	when	studying	elite	discourse	and	action.		
	 First,	the	concept	is	both	critical	and	empathetic.	It	pays	attention	to	the	subtleness	
of	 people’s	 own	 accounts,	 while	 also	 acknowledging	 the	 social,	 political	 and	 economic	
consequences	of	selective	awareness.	 In	other	words,	 it	combines	a	critical	analysis	of	the	
broader	 structural	 conditions	 in	 which	 willful	 blindness	 is	 embedded	 with	 a	 focus	 on	
personal	 or	 individual	 experience	 –	 without	 prioritising	 one	 over	 the	 other.	 Secondly,	
highlighting	 the	 fundamental	 contradiction	of	 the	 two	constituent	 terms	–	willfulness	and	
blindness	 –	 we	 are	 able	 to	 dissolve	 the	 opposition	 between	 strategic	 intention	 and	
naturalised	disposition,	which	is	often	projected	onto	elites	and	non-elites	respectively.	As	
the	articles	in	this	special	issue	show,	deliberate	blindness	can	be	institutionalised	in	a	way	
that	 it	 becomes	 a	 naturalised	 disposition;	 awareness	 can	 slip	 in	 and	 out	 of	 focus,	 which	
makes	it	hard	to	determine	specific	degrees	of	intentionality	in	social	in/action.	Thirdly,	the	
notion	 of	 willful	 blindness	 allows	 us	 to	 examine	 the	 interplay	 of	 cognitive	 and	 affective	
processes.	These	are	not	only	relevant	when	determining	what	can	or	cannot	be	seen,	but	
also	 in	 deciding	 the	 very	 rules	 of	 defining	 what	 constitutes	 objects	 of	 knowledge	 and	
collective	 or	 personal	 responsibility.	 By	 combining	 the	 anthropology	 of	 ignorance	 with	 a	
critical	discussion	of	intention,	perception	and	affect,	we	highlight	the	dynamic	and	unstable	
processes	involved	in	constituting	willful	blindness.		
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These	discussions	of	 the	 role	of	 intention	and	perception	 in	 social	 action	 resonate	
with	much	older	debates.	Karl	Marx’s	analysis	of	 the	social	 conditions	of	alienation	under	
capitalism	 is	 similarly	 based	 on	 scepticism	 towards	 intentionality	 since	 it	 holds	 that	
individuals	might	not	understand	or	control	their	intentions	because	the	material	conditions	
they	find	themselves	in	obscure	perceptions	of	reality.	Enlightenment	offered	a	remedy	for	
those	who	 in	Marx’s	words	 ‘they	do	not	know	 it,	but	 they	do	 it’	 (Marx	1976	 [1867]).	Yet,	
authors	 such	 as	 Peter	 Sloterdijk	 counters	 the	 naïve	 idealism	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘false	
consciousness’	 with	 a	 respectful	 pessimism	 more	 attuned	 to	 the	 proliferation	 of	 cynical	
reasoning,	in	which	people	‘know	what	they	are	doing,	but	they	do	it	[anyway]’,	often	out	of	
self-preservation	(1988:	5;	see	also	Žižek	1989:	25).		
However,	both	Sloterdijk	and	Marx’s	positions	assume	that	the	world	can	be	divided	
into	 true	 and	 false	 facts	 and	 that	 reality	 can	 be	 known	 fully	 by	 those	 participating	 in	 it.	
Notions	like	false	consciousness	therefore	seem	judgemental	to	post-truth	critics	because	it	
is	not	seen	to	take	people’s	own	explanations	seriously.	However,	like	the	concept	of	false	
consciousness,	 which	 is	 only	 judgemental	 if	 one	 assumes	 there	 is	 such	 a	 thing	 as	 ‘true	
consciousness’,	willful	blindness	is	only	judgemental	if	one	assumes	there	is	ever	‘complete	
vision’.	 If	we	accept	that	all	visions,	 including	those	of	 the	analyst,	are	 limited,	blurred,	or	
refracted	 in	different	ways,	willful	blindness	becomes	a	highly	productive	 concept.	 To	 say	
that	 all	 awareness	 or	 knowledge	 of	 reality	 is	 limited	 and	 subjective	 does	 not	 imply	 a	
rejection	of	reality	–	only	an	acknowledgment	that	 it	cannot	be	fully	or	definitively	known	
(Graeber	2015b).		
This	brings	us	to	the	final	point:	notably,	the	importance	of	combining	an	analysis	of	
the	collective	production	of	ignorance	with	an	analysis	of	the	unstable	social	fields	through	
which	 ‘ignorance’	 travels,	 and	 the	 importance	 to	 analysing	 its	 effects.	 ‘Underlying	 all	
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intended	 interactions	 of	 human	 beings	 is	 their	 unintended	 interdependence’	 (Elias	 1969:	
143).	 Although	 not	 addressing	 (lack	 of)	 knowledge	 as	 such,	 Norbert	 Elias’	 statement	
contains	 an	 important	 reminder	 for	 discussions	 ignorance.	 Put	 simply,	 in	 chains	 of	
information	 transmission,	 the	willful	 blindness	 of	 some	will	 produce	 genuine	 blindness	 in	
those	 further	 down	 the	 line.	 The	 relevant	 point	 is	 that	 intentionality	 and	 awareness	 are	
unevenly	distributed	in	interrelated	social	fields.	Part	of	the	challenge	posed	by	the	concept	
of	willful	blindness	is	to	examine	how	political	and	economic	conditions	are	able	to	stabilise	
and	 institutionalise	 some	 forms	 of	 willful	 blindness	 and	 how,	 despite	 the	 fluctuation	 of	
intention,	ignorance	and	awareness	are	embedded	in	larger	fields	of	power.	
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